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COOPERATION (2012). Pp. 336. Paper $18.00. 
 
According to the old teaching, American politics were marked by a stable consen-
sus on fundamental values that ran so deep it constituted almost a pathology.1 A patholo-
gy or perhaps a blessing, it endowed the polity with a stability that absorbed dissenting 
voices.2 Amid the consensus of the mid and late twentieth century in the United States, 
parties famously overlapped so completely that they were indistinguishable. Most im-
portant legislation was passed by whopping bipartisan majorities in the period from 1945 
to 1990. As David Mayhew wrote of the period, Capitol Hill was marked by a “mindset 
of problem-solving,” not one of ideological combat.3 
By the late 1990s, however, the traditional teaching about American politics had 
grown noticeably obsolete. Several events combined in a short time that together sug-
gested a country coming apart. Republicans in the House of Representatives, who in 
1994 had won a majority for the first time in forty years, voted in 1998 to impeach a 
popular Democratic president. Only two years later, the country split almost perfectly 
evenly in the presidential election, and in the absence of widely-known procedures for 
settling the election, the United States Supreme Court stepped in with a vote that predict-
ably mirrored the partisan split on the Court.4 Only two years after that, President Bush’s 
politicizing of national security in the 2002 mid-term elections made foreign policy and 
national defense a divisive and partisan question. 
                                                	   *	   Robert	   Clements	   Associate	   Professor	   of	   Democracy	   and	   Politics,	   Department	   of	   Government,	  Dartmouth	  College.	  	  	   1.	  	   	  See	   generally	   LOUIS	   HARTZ,	   THE	   LIBERAL	   TRADITION	   IN	   AMERICA:	   AN	   INTERPRETATION	   OF	   AMERICAN	  POLITICAL	  THOUGHT	  SINCE	  THE	  REVOLUTION	  (2d	  ed.,	  1991);	  THE	  CIVIC	  CULTURE	  REVISITED,	  (Gabriel	  A.	  Almond	  &	  Sidney	  Verba	  eds.,	  1965).	  	  	   2.	  	   See	  Herbert	  Marcuse,	  Repressive	  Tolerance,	  in	  A	  CRITIQUE	  OF	  PURE	  TOLERANCE	  81,	  95-­‐97	  (1969).	  	  	   3.	  	   DAVID	  MAYHEW,	  DIVIDED	  WE	  GOVERN:	  PARTY	  CONTROL,	  LAWMAKING,	  AND	  INVESTIGATIONS,	  1946-­‐1990,	  at	  134	  (1991).	  	   4.	  	   See	  Bush	  v.	  Gore,	  531	  U.S.	  98	  (2000).	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These three events, married as they ineluctably were to polarizing personalities—
Bill Clinton and George W. Bush—inflamed partisan passions in a manner perhaps not 
seen in American politics since the late nineteenth century. One might have thought at 
the time that the hyper partisanship of the day was a reflection of these idiosyncratic po-
larizing shocks to the political system, and that soon enough the normal patterns of 
American politics could reestablish themselves.5 
Alas, normal politics is not coming back. Since 2010, when the Republican Party 
(again) won control of the House, passing what was once regarded as routine legislation 
has become almost impossible. Exhibit A, of course, is the debt limit debacle from the 
summer of 2011. But more obscure measures are also attributable to the partisan split, 
such as reauthorizing the import-export bank.6 As the lopsided vote to pass President 
Obama’s Affordable Care Act shows, important legislation is no longer passed by bipar-
tisan majorities.7 When the parties divide control of the legislature and the executive, it is 
difficult to pass any legislation (when Congress went into recess in the summer of 2013, 
only twenty-two bills had been passed by both Houses of Congress and sent to the Presi-
dent to be signed—the least productive legislative record for any Congress since political 
scientists started keeping track in the 1940s).8 Rather than cooperate, even on the invisi-
ble margins, members of Congress prefer to repeat inconsequential symbolic votes, such 
as the forty (and counting) votes Congress has taken to repeal the Affordable Care Act 
since 2010.9 
Ten years ago, the scholarly consensus was that this kind of hyper partisanship was 
an affliction of political elites: ordinary Americans who did not make a living off politics 
continued to share a broadly liberal, tolerant, non-judgmental, and anti-conflictual sensi-
bility.10 Today, the sense that America itself is ‘divided’ no longer looks like journalistic 
hype, and is increasingly corroborated by scholars who point out that the engaged public 
generally shares the more emphatically partisan views of political elites.11 If we are not 
                                                	   5.	  	   This	   reflected	   the	   sensibility	   of	   analysts	   such	   as	  Morris	   Fiorina	   and	   Alan	  Wolfe.	   See	   MORRIS	   P.	  FIORINA,	  SAMUEL	  J.	  ABRAMS	  &	  JEREMY	  C.	  POPE,	  CULTURE	  WAR?:	  THE	  MYTH	  OF	  A	  POLARIZED	  AMERICA	  1-­‐8	  (2011);	  ALAN	  WOLFE,	  ONE	  NATION,	  AFTER	  ALL:	  WHAT	  MIDDLE-­‐CLASS	  AMERICANS	  REALLY	  THINK	  ABOUT:	  GOD,	  COUNTRY,	  FAMILY,	  RACISM,	  WELFARE,	  IMMIGRATION,	  HOMOSEXUALITY,	  WORK,	  THE	  RIGHT,	  THE	  LEFT,	  AND	  EACH	  OTHER	  16-­‐17,	  320-­‐21	  (1998).	  	   6.	  	   See	   Ed	  O’Keefe,	  Export-­‐Import	  Bank	  Reauthorized	   by	  House;	   Senate	   Expected	   to	  Act	   Soon,	  WASH.	  POST,	   May	   9,	   2012,	   http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/export-­‐import-­‐bank-­‐reauthorization-­‐set-­‐to-­‐pass/2012/05/08/gIQAoAzPBUblog.html.	  	   7.	  	   The	  Act	  was	  passed	  sixty	  to	  thirty-­‐nine	  in	  the	  Senate,	  with	  every	  Democrat	  and	  Independent	  vot-­‐ing	  against	  every	  Republican,	  and	  by	  219	  to	  212	  in	  the	  House,	  with	  219	  Democrats	  voting	  against	  every	  Republican	  and	  thirty-­‐four	  Democrats.	  U.S.	  Senate	  Roll	  Call	  Votes	  111th	  Congress	  –	  1st	  Session,	  SENATE.GOV,	  http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00396);	  U.S.	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  Final	  Vote	  Results	  for	  Roll	  Call	  165,	  CLERKHOUSE.GOV,	  availa-­‐
ble	  at	  http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2010/roll165.xml.	  	   8.	  	   Rachel	  Weiner	  &	  Ed	  O’Keefe,	  Judging	  the	  (Un)productivity	  of	  the	  113th	  Congress,	  WASH.	  POST,	  Aug.	  2,	   2013,	   http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-­‐fix/wp/2013/08/02/judging-­‐the-­‐unproductivity-­‐of-­‐the-­‐113th-­‐congress/.	  	   9.	  	   See	  	  Amanda	  Terkel,	  House	  GOP	  Votes	  to	  Repeal	  Obamacare	  for	  40th	  Time,	  HUFFINGTON	  POST,	  Aug.	  2,	  2013,	  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/02/gop-­‐obamacare-­‐vote_n_3695871.html.	  	   10.	  	   	  See	   FIORINA	   ET	   AL.,	   supra	   note	   5,	   at	   8;	  WOLFE,	   supra	   note	   5,	   at	   309,	   320-­‐21;	   John	  H.	   Evans,	  Have	  
Americans’	  Attitudes	  Become	  More	  Polarized?—An	  Update,	  84	  SOC.	  SCIENCE	  Q.	  71,	  86-­‐87	  (2003).	  	   11.	  	   See	  ALAN	  I.	  ABRAMOWITZ,	  THE	  DISAPPEARING	  CENTER:	  ENGAGED	  CITIZENS,	  POLARIZATION,	  AND	  AMERICAN	  DEMOCRACY	  x	  (2011);	  MARC	  J.	  HETHERINGTON	  &	  JONATHAN	  D.	  WEILER,	  AUTHORITARIANISM	  AND	  POLARIZATION	  IN	  AMERICAN	   POLITICS	   16-­‐17	   (2009);	   Carl	   Desportes	   Bowman,	   The	   Myth	   of	   a	   Non-­‐Polarized	   America,	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coming apart, we are certainly not coming together. 
As for the cause, the usual suspects are easy to locate. Narrow-casting news, pri-
mary electorates dominated by wing nuts, and the perfection of the gerrymander together 
punish anyone who puts governing above scoring symbolic points. Especially if anyone 
happens to be a Republican: nearly anyone in the Republican Party, even Senate Minori-
ty Leader Mitch McConnell, is vulnerable to a conservative challenger in the primary. 
Republicans are still better off to show no willingness whatsoever to get together with 
Democrats (as one Republican aide on Capitol Hill said, “[w]e actually want to cut 
spending and reduce government.”).12 Given the state of partisan disagreement, no credit 
comes to those who discover ways of coming together—a skill always at the heart of the 
art of governing and the reason governing is always an art. 
THE PROBLEM OF COOPERATION 
Is the art of governing and, more generally, the art of living together at risk? Are 
we in danger of losing the skills that facilitate political cooperation? If people naturally 
cooperated for their mutual advantage, politics would be a very different thing—a sci-
ence of coordination, akin to engineering. The open question in the history of political 
thought is whether people can cooperate for their mutual benefit without somehow being 
coerced to. It is only because people so reliably have difficulty getting out of their own 
way that politics is something more vexing (and interesting); the political problem is 
never finally solved. 
In traditional political philosophy, the skills that hold political communities to-
gether are the consequence of an elaborate and intrusive education. “Education” hardly 
captures the extent to which the city reaches into and shapes every citizen. Statecraft is 
soul craft. The modern view seems to make coming together more a matter of argument, 
as if we should be reasonable enough to see the advantages of cooperation. But this ar-
gument relies on an education of its own that makes some purposes (longevity and pros-
perity) seem more publicly respectable than others (virtue or salvation). As it comes 
from a figure like Hobbes, the agreement depends on an epistemology that demotes reve-
lation and obliterates the basis for justified pride. For both ancients and moderns, politi-
cal cooperation requires a kind of skill or virtue—a way of being and seeing—that is al-
ways fragile. 
Perhaps this fragility is being put to the test amid the hyper partisanship and refusal 
to compromise that marks contemporary American politics. Recent works by four prom-
inent social and political theorists illuminate the habits of mind and character that politi-
cal cooperation requires: Robert Goodin’s elegant On Settling,13 Richard Sennett’s inimi-
table Together: The Rituals, Pleasures and Politics of Cooperation,14 and Amy Gutmann 
and Dennis Thompson’s powerful analysis, The Spirit of Compromise: Why Governing 
                                                                                                                    HEDGEHOG	  REV.	  65,	  66-­‐68	  (2010).	  	   12.	  	   Weiner	  &	  O’Keefe,	  supra	  note	  8.	  	   13.	  	   ROBERT	  GOODIN,	  ON	  SETTLING	  (2012).	  	   14.	  	   RICHARD	  SENNETT,	  TOGETHER:	  THE	  RITUALS,	  PLEASURES	  AND	  POLITICS	  OF	  COOPERATION	  (2012)	  [hereinaf-­‐ter	  SENNETT,	  TOGETHER].	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Demands It and Campaigning Undermines It.15 
Taken together, these books suggest we have to relearn, or think ourselves back in-
to some very elemental political virtues. Calling them virtues does not implicate us in 
any kind of larger virtue theory, as if the only way or the best way to justify coercive leg-
islation is by reference to some conception of the highest good. To classify the skills that 
bring us together and hold us together as ‘virtues’ only means that they are learned 
through doing, they are deployed independent of short-run selfish calculations, and they 
are easier to lose than to acquire.16 Nor are these books about what Rawls calls “the first 
virtue of social institutions:” they are not about justice, but something more elemental.17 
The question is not what the most reasonable terms for social cooperation might be, but 
whether we can cooperate at all. These authors are focusing on something basic: political 
virtue, or the habits of mind and character that contribute to political community. Wheth-
er the community is just—whether it might be more just—are questions for a sunnier 
day, when we can take political cooperation, settling, compromise, and coming together 
more for granted. 
Some might attribute the current difficulty of coming together to the contingent 
context of party competition in the United States, where, at the moment, each side can 
reasonably expect to run the whole government. In the past fifteen years, each party has 
enjoyed a moment of unified party control of the legislature and the executive, and each 
side looks to the next election as the event that may return it to full control. Under these 
expectations, neither party has much of an interest in cooperating with the other, espe-
cially if that cooperation makes the other side more successful and thus, more likely to 
fare well in the next election. 
This analysis is fair enough, but what we have witnessed in the recent past goes 
well beyond matters of partisan calculations. When the minority leader of the Senate 
proclaims, just prior to an election, that “[t]he single most important thing [Republicans] 
want to achieve is for President Obama to be a one-term president,” something deeper 
than electoral calculation is at work.18 To make this, rather than some larger policy or 
purpose, the avowed goal of a party, and to proclaim it without embarrassment on the 
eve of an election, reflects a public culture where opponents are made to be enemies, 
where responsibility for governing is viewed as dispensable, and where low partisan 
machinations displace high partisan purposes. Such a statement mocks the very ideal—
elusive though it must always be—of a common good, and thus, there is no shame in 
adopting a policy of continuous obstruction. A statement like this says something not on-
ly about the person who utters it, but about the audience the speaker could take for grant-
ed. What we are up against is more than a matter of calculation. 
                                                	   15.	  	   AMY	   GUTMANN	   &	   DENNIS	   THOMPSON,	   THE	   SPIRIT	   OF	   COMPROMISE:	   WHY	   GOVERNING	   DEMANDS	   IT	   AND	  CAMPAIGNING	  UNDERMINES	  IT	  (2012).	  	   16.	  	   	  See	  ARISTOTLE,	  NICOMACHEAN	  ETHICS	  27-­‐31	  (Roger	  Crisp	  trans.,	  2000).	  	  	   17.	  	   JOHN	  RAWLS,	  A	  THEORY	  OF	  JUSTICE	  3	  (1971)	  [hereinafter	  RAWLS,	  A	  THEORY	  OF	  JUSTICE].	  	   18.	  	   Glenn	  Kessler,	  When	  Did	  McConnell	  Say	  He	  Wanted	  to	  Make	  Obama	  a	  ‘One-­‐Term	  President’?,	  WASH.	  POST,	   Sept.	   25,	   2012,	   http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-­‐checker/post/when-­‐did-­‐mcconnell-­‐say-­‐he-­‐wanted-­‐to-­‐make-­‐obama-­‐a-­‐one-­‐term-­‐president/2012/09/24/79fd5cd8-­‐0696-­‐11e2-­‐afff-­‐d6c7f20a83bf_blog.html.	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COOPERATION AS CRAFT 
“We are losing the skills of cooperation needed to make a complex society work,” 
Richard Sennett observes.19 Indeed, Sennett sees a “new character type emerging in 
modern society, an uncooperative self,” prone to narcissism, withdrawal, and boredom.20 
The uncooperative self represents what Sennett called in an earlier book, “[t]he corrosion 
of character.”21 Beset by its anxieties and fears, it cannot locate a settled relation between 
passions and actions and in the process liberate actions from the rule of passions.22 Ra-
ther than “rising to difficult occasions,” the uncooperative self withdraws from disturb-
ance.23 “What gives voluntary withdrawal its psychological weight,” Sennett says, “is the 
desire to reduce anxiety, particularly the anxiety of addressing needs other than one’s 
own.”24 
We are becoming, in Sennett’s view, what Tocqueville feared: hyper-individualists 
who retreat from the public into the private sphere where we can manage our discontents 
more successfully by escaping the disturbing differences and inequalities that public life 
makes plain.25 In the process, we are happier but less powerful—and we lose the demo-
cratic skills by which people come ‘together’ and assert their claim. 
For Tocqueville, the cause of excess privatism was democracy itself.26 The 
“equality of conditions” made differential achievement more difficult to bear, which is 
why democratic people are, for Tocqueville, the most anxious.27 Sennett, too, finds the 
cause in society generally—in social and economic inequality (which in Sennett’s analy-
sis reflects an inequality of conditions).28 For Sennett, the primary problem is the charac-
ter of the work.29 Returning to a theme he has illuminated more forcefully than any con-
temporary observer—and, in a sense, to the theme that unifies his career—Sennett puts 
work at the center of contemporary society and politics. What people do every day, over 
and over, the discipline they cannot escape—this is the site of the habitual activity that 
shapes who we are. And increasingly, Sennett argues, the experience of work is making 
us less cooperative.30 
Especially in an elaborate division of labor, work is the quintessential form of co-
operation: it is where we give one thing for the sake of getting others. But the refinement 
and extension of the division of labor itself makes the cooperative aspect of work less 
visible to the worker: it is difficult to see how one very particular and perhaps mundane 
task contributes to anything meaningful, and the experience of tending to one task re-
peatedly causes social skills to atrophy. This is what one might call the ‘old critique of 
                                                	   19.	  	   SENNETT,	  TOGETHER,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  9.	  	  	   20.	  	   Id.	  at	  30,	  182-­‐90.	  	   21.	  	   See	   RICHARD	   SENNETT,	   THE	   CORROSION	   OF	   CHARACTER:	   THE	   PERSONAL	   CONSEQUENCES	   OF	  WORK	   IN	   THE	  NEW	  CAPITALISM	  9-­‐10	  (2000)	  [hereinafter	  SENNETT,	  THE	  CORROSION	  OF	  CHARACTER].	  	   22.	  	   See	  SENNETT,	  TOGETHER,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  179.	  	  	   23.	  	   Id.	  	  	   24.	  	   Id.	  at	  190.	  	  	   25.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  187-­‐90;	  ALEXIS	  DE	  TOCQUEVILLE,	  2	  DEMOCRACY	  IN	  AMERICA	  CH.	  2	  (1840).	  	   26.	  	   See	  id.	  	  	   27.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  187-­‐88.	  	   28.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  191.	  	  	   29.	  	   See	  id.	  191-­‐92.	  	  	   30.	  	   See	  id.	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work,’ the critique that runs from Marx to Braverman.31 In recent decades, the industrial 
structure of work that gave rise to the old critique has been transformed: post-industrial 
work is more about manipulating symbols than material things, is more about flexibility 
and specialization and less about mass production, and is more likely to take place in an 
office or retail setting than a factory. The new world of work might seem to offer some 
relief from the alienation so endemic to the old. 
But in Sennett’s astute analysis, the new world of work gives rise to a new kind of 
deprivation. The new workplace has little of what Sennett calls “earned authority:” the 
people on top are reviled by those in the back office for their lack of care, their incompe-
tence, their disdain for making an enduring social contribution.32 When the people run-
ning the place are just out for a quick buck, the people working the place no longer trust 
those in command. Beyond this loss of trust is a loss of skill. The ideal of skill only 
makes sense with reference to activities that can be done better or worse independent of 
how they fare in the market: a good carpenter may or may not be a successful one. With 
the demise of the long-term contract between workers and employers, with the rise of the 
expectation that everyone will change jobs multiple times over the course of a ‘career,’ it 
makes less sense to invest in firm-specific skills. As workers need to manage their per-
sonal brand more than their skills, the “ideal worker,” Sennett says, is the “consultant”—
someone who can deploy and even transform ‘skills’ to suit ever-changing projects.33 
When skill becomes quaint and trust becomes scarce, we lose a way of talking and 
listening to each other. In particular, we are at risk of losing an ability to engage in “dia-
logical” conversation.34 This kind of talk, unlike dialectical talk that aims for a decision 
point or a resolution, is comparatively aimless and unstructured.35 It is more like gossip 
and less like a structured meeting. In dialogical conversation, we speak about our 
thoughts and feelings and listen to others’, even if this does not bring us closer or lead to 
mutual understanding or culminate in an agreement. Dialogical conversation might illu-
minate differences more starkly—it might reveal how far apart we are. But in the course 
of discovering how far we might be from another, we learn something about how to situ-
ate ourselves with respect to others. 
Respect is the key: we learn to respect others, in all their differences, even as we 
might not agree with them. In the course of this, we learn, perhaps without knowing it, 
something about how to cooperate with others.36 We might say (though Sennett does 
not): this is public reason, the reason of the public. 
Sennett sees craft work—and specifically, the work of repairing things—as central 
to cultivating a dialogical capacity.37 Repair is not an algorithmic activity. There are 
‘how-to’ guides, but no guide can supply all the familiarity that is necessary for a good 
                                                	   31.	  	   See	  generally	  	  HARRY	  BRAVERMAN,	   LABOR	   AND	  MONOPOLY	   CAPITAL:	   THE	  DEGRADATION	   OF	  WORK	   IN	   THE	  TWENTIETH	  CENTURY	   (1975);	  Karl	  Marx,	  Estranged	  Labour,	   in	   ECONOMIC	  AND	  PHILOSOPHIC	  MANUSCRIPTS	  OF	  1844,	  http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm.	  	   32.	  	   SENNETT,	  TOGETHER,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  148.	  	  	   33.	  	   Id.	  at	  161.	  	   34.	  	   Id.	  at	  24.	  	  	   35.	  	   Id.	  at	  18-­‐20.	  	  	   36.	  	   Id.	  	  115,	  127.	  	   37.	  	   Id.	  at	  199.	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diagnosis or execution. To repair, one must know the material, the purpose, and be con-
nected to a community of practitioners who share ideas and knowledge. This sharing is 
sometimes didactic, when one simply knows a lot more than another; but more often it is 
dialogical—exploratory, experimental, seeking without fully knowing what it is seeking 
for. To repair our world, we need to learn something about how to repair more generally. 
Sennett’s analysis is marked by a trace of nostalgia: he looks back fondly on the 
artisanal workshop, on the Boston bakeries where he did interviews in the early 1970s, 
and on the lost world of the post-war American working class where cooperation was 
something more natural.38 Our world today is not a world that prizes repair; our political 
economy is predicated not on repair but replacement. Locating the vestigial practices that 
nourish an ethos of repair might be essential to remaking the habits of cooperation. These 
vestigial practices exist wherever the idea of skill continues to make sense and continues 
to bind people together in communities that transmit understandings of excellence and 
communicate innovations and discoveries. 
Sennett is betting that no social world can entirely do away with skill. Every social 
world, even one that celebrates flexibility to the point where stability and long job ten-
ures are signs of failure, will nonetheless elicit some kinds of skill. The kind of talk that 
might bring us together without making us the same—dialogical talk—is not something 
that needs to be grafted onto society like some cure from the outside. It is within the 
communities of skill we cannot entirely do without. The ingredients of coming together 
remain even as we might be coming apart. 
Whether we can make use of these ingredients amid the insecurity that now besets 
the world of work is a further question. Profitable firms are bought out by new owners, 
who find efficiencies: with each change, workers are sized up anew, by the numbers, 
without regard for their skill or their service. Decent businesses are made unprofitable as 
managers take on catastrophic risks: workers are left to manage their own unemploy-
ment, their loyalty betrayed. The successful focus is not on what they can contribute, but 
on what they can take with them—they are ‘flexible,’ ready for change. In a time where 
change is capricious, Sennett looks back appreciatively to an earlier world of work where 
firms and jobs were more fixed. 
FIXIDITY 
Fixing things—not repairing them, but imposing some constancy on them, settling 
them—is a precondition of agency, Robert Goodin argues.39 We settle up, we settle 
down, and we settle for what we settle on. Living is about settling. It is about striving as 
well, which is in some sense the opposite of settling; but before we start, we have to set-
tle on what we are going to strive for, and when the race is won, we have to learn to set-
tle for whatever we have managed to achieve. Goodin’s exploration of settling is in part 
therapeutic philosophy. Settling on a personal level is a necessary counterpoint to striv-
ing, and living well involves settling well. Beyond the personal, politics too is about set-
tling: politics begins when people settle. This is true in a literal sense, as settled agricul-
                                                	   38.	  	   Id.	  at	  148.	  	  	   39.	  	   GOODIN,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  36.	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ture is the precondition for political community as we know it. When revolutions and 
wars end well they give rise to a settlement, at which point normal politics can begin. 
Within normal politics, fair legislation reflects some kind of settlement among intersect-
ing and sometimes rival interests. To be political, we have to settle. 
Unifying the various senses of the term, according to Goodin, is a “[m]aster 
[n]otion”: “[s]ettling [o]n.”40 We settle on a place to live when we settle in. We settle on 
terms of agreement when we settle up. We settle on an option by settling for it. Settling 
on seems to be at the core of the concept.41 
But perhaps this formulation elides the moral core of the concept. This core is a 
certain kind of acknowledgment of others and their claims. To acknowledge that another 
person has a legitimate entitlement or is deserving of something is to possess the virtue 
of justice: a just person gives others their due. Settling is related to this, but it calls for 
more than a just acknowledgment of valid claims. The status of many claims, perhaps 
most claims, is a matter of dispute. What constitutes fair taxation, for example, or a just 
public expense  is the stuff of political contestation. Moreover, people can be counted on 
to advance claims that go beyond what they could reasonably be said to deserve. 
“[E]verywhere we come upon the dear self,” as Kant says, and it is perfectly ordinary to 
believe we deserve more than we in fact do, or to believe that others deserve less than 
they in fact do.42 
Tempering this tendency, “settling” takes an ability to acknowledge the claims of 
others, whether they are just claims or not. Politics cooperation requires that we 
acknowledge others’ claims regardless of whether we think they are just. “‘Settling for,’” 
Goodin says, “is a matter of making do. It is a matter of deciding what is ‘good enough.’ 
It is a matter of settling for something less than ‘everything.’”43 Both justice and, more 
simply, living with others in a political community, require citizens who can settle for 
“something less than ‘everything.’”44 The disposition to settle might constitute meionex-
ia, or a willingness to accept less than one’s due—a quality the Cynics thought a virtue 
but that under unequal conditions might be a kind of self-effacement that perpetuates in-
justice.45 Yet where justice is in dispute (as it always is), and where people are prone to 
claim more than they are due (as they always are), the disposition to settle is a kind of 
virtue. There is perhaps no way to live together—peacefully, cooperatively, and demo-
cratically—without it.  
This is what settling is about, politically speaking: acknowledging the claims of 
others and moderating one’s own somewhat independently of what everyone seems to 
deserve. It is a bit like conceding an argument while you think you might still be right. 
But it is not really a concession. It is simply an acknowledgment that there are other ar-
guments, and yours has not persuaded everyone. If striving is the counterpoint to settling 
                                                	   40.	  	   Id.	  at	  27	  (emphasis	  added).	  	  	   41.	  	   Id.	  at	  27-­‐29.	  	   42.	  	   Immanuel	   Kant,	   Transition	   from	   Popular	   Moral	   Philosophy	   to	   the	   Metaphysic	   of	   Morals,	   in	  GROUNDWORK	   FOR	   THE	   METAPHYSICS	   OF	   MORALS	   (1785),	   available	   at	  http://ethics.sandiego.edu/Books/Kant/MM/Part2.html.	  	   43.	  	   GOODIN,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  25.	  	  	   44.	  	   Id.	  	  	   45.	  	   Id.	  at	  26.	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in personal affairs, the counterpoint in politics is striving to make your own claims 
rule—never giving up. It is a failure to recognize the claims advanced by others, to take 
them into consideration, and to come to any kind of accommodation. 
Goodin is keen to point out that settling is not the same as compromising—it is not 
necessarily about giving up something (perhaps of principled importance) in order to get 
something.46 Settling, in contrast to compromise, is sometimes just a matter of resolve, a 
willingness to try something among perhaps equally palatable and equally unpredictable 
options.47 We settle on a policy to reduce carbon emissions because the problem is urgent 
and some policy is better than no policy. 
But this presumes that the we in question is a unified actor, the political equivalent 
of a person. To accomplish anything personally or politically, we must settle, usually be-
fore we can know whether what we settle on is best. In politics, the we is always a dis-
unified actor, which is what gives settling in its political sense a distinctive meaning. To 
settle in politics is always with others: we settle up, settle on, settle for, settle down, and 
settle in with other people. In all of these senses settling involves somehow taking into 
account the claims others advance. In this sense—politically—settling is a very close 
cousin of compromise. If not identical, they are similar in the way they express a will-
ingness to acknowledge the claims others advance somewhat regardless of whether we 
think the claims are valid. 
Our politics, at least in the U.S., is today full of insistence and striving—striving to 
embarrass one’s opponents, to defeat the agenda of the other side, to win the next elec-
tion, to have our way. Perhaps we have forgotten something about how to settle. 
THE SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE 
The willingness to accommodate the claims of others, so at the heart of settling as 
a political matter, involves a kind of respect. Respect is also at the core of Amy Gutmann 
and Dennis Thompson’s astute and timely account of the “[s]pirit of [c]ompromise.”48 If 
Sennett looks at the everyday practices of social life and Goodin at a fundamental con-
cept hiding in plain view, Gutmann and Thompson look to the formal polity—especially 
the legislature. They notice that while “compromise” has always had a sharp edge (to be 
called “compromised” or be discovered in compromising circumstances is never good), 
it will always be a kind of virtue in democratic politics.49 Democratic politics will be a 
contest, if not a cacophony. “[G]overning a democracy without compromise,” Gutmann 
and Thompson say, “is impossible.”50 The common good is always a matter of disagree-
ment. As Gutmann and Thompson say, “the common ground is more barren . . . than the 
inspiring rhetoric in its favor might suggest.”51 
The difficulty of finding common ground is amplified by contemporary conditions 
of accentuated partisanship, but it is nothing new. Being uncompromising can seem no-
                                                	   46.	  	   Id.	  at	  52-­‐53.	  	   47.	  	   Id.	  at	  54.	  	  	   48.	  	   GUTMANN	  &	  THOMPSON,	  supra	  note	  15.	  	   49.	  	   Id.	  at	  21-­‐22.	  	  	   50.	  	   Id.	  at	  1.	  	   51.	  	   Id.	  at	  13.	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bler and more fun. As James Madison noted, we are more readily inclined to vex and to 
oppress each other than to cooperate for our common advantage. It is satisfying to take a 
stand on principle—but it can be even more satisfying to deny (“vex”) one’s oppo-
nents—so what if you are worse off as a result? When perfect victory is impossible 
(when is it not, in democracy?), defeating the other side is one of the few lasting pleas-
ures politics offers. 
Inducing people to overcome their temptation to indulge the pleasures of associa-
bility is the point of political science. Institutions can go a long way to teasing out com-
promises that are not, on their own, forthcoming. But the fundamental point of Gutmann 
and Thompson’s argument is that institutions are not a sufficient cure to the associable 
inclinations that beset political life.52 Citizens—and especially officials—must bring to 
institutions a particular kind of “mindset.”53 
A mindset is a psychological stance, a “cluster of attitudes and arguments” that 
culminates in an orientation to action.54 A mindset is not the consequence of a cost-
benefit calculation—it is not mere prudence or rationale self-interest. Rather, it is a psy-
chological orientation that makes cost-benefit calculation possible. It frames what counts 
as a cost or a benefit. Is it better to stand on principle and get nothing, or to compromise 
and lose something important, while also getting something important? It is possible to 
write an algorithm that formalizes such a decision—but it is not possible to run such an 
algorithm in the real world. Uncertainties abound in the political world, and today’s los-
ers often turn out to be tomorrow’s winners, though no one saw it coming. Given the un-
predictability of political things, any algorithm than tries to quantify the benefits and 
costs of compromise would not be worth the paper it is scrawled on. 
To be sure, whether to compromise will always depend in part on prudential calcu-
lation. For many Republicans, the current calculus of “getting primaried” is enough to 
overcome any mindset, especially in certain Republican districts. But this merely shifts 
the argument from officials who serve at the pleasure of their constituents to citizens 
more generally: why do voters, especially primary voters, prefer to get nothing from an 
uncompromising representative over getting something from an official who is willing to 
hammer out judicious compromises? Answering this compels us to go beyond the calcu-
lus of self-interest, and enter into the “mindset” of such voters. It is not as if we can re-
duce the causal importance of mindsets to something allegedly more real or calculable. 
Mindsets—habits of mind that make some actions more likely, or virtues by another 
name—are as real as it gets. 
At the heart of the mindset of compromise is a certain kind of “mutual respect.”55 
The kind of mutual respect that the authors advance is not quite what is at the core of the 
ideal of public reason and deliberative democracy. There, respect is conceived of as reci-
procity, or as a willingness to give and take reasons when advancing political goals. Giv-
ing and taking reasons, on its own, may or may not lead to compromise. What it express-
es is the crucial thing. A willingness to give and to take reasons expresses a respect for 
                                                	   52.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  65-­‐66.	  	  	   53.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  10,	  64-­‐69,	  204-­‐09.	  	   54.	  	   Id.	  at	  64.	  	   55.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  17,	  34,	  60,	  100,	  109-­‐29,	  178,	  201.	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other beings as reasonable and rational beings. The archetype of public reason under-
stood this way—as Rawls says—is the Supreme Court.56 In a full decision, the Court 
does not merely issue a conclusion (“Remanded!”). The decision comes with reasons at-
tached. And the reasons of the majority are complemented by the reasons of the minority 
if the decision is split. But crafting a majority—on the Supreme Court or anywhere 
else—that is where the action is. The reasons that brought the majority together may or 
may not be evident from reading the majority decision. Beyond that, there is no reason to 
think that merely making one’s reasons clear will persuade anyone else: the minority on 
the Court is what it is in any particular decision because the majority could not persuade 
it. 
Merely hearing reasons and giving reasons does not necessarily get us anywhere 
(together). Politics, especially the compromise that successful governing cannot do with-
out, requires respect of a different sort. The respect at the heart of the mindset of com-
promise involves seeing one’s opponents in a particular kind of way. Perhaps it is more 
accurate to say that it involves not seeing them in a particular kind of way—not as ene-
mies to be defeated, not as ethically deficient beings needing to be exiled, not as self-
interested slobs who cannot think straight. Not seeing one’s opponents these ways means 
not seeing oneself in certain ways also: as bearing the full force of reason and moral 
righteousness, as unfailingly impartial and true, as possessing the superior intelligence 
untainted by selfish consideration. To have a compromising mindset involves seeing 
one’s opponents not only as bearers of reasons that can be given voice, but as legiti-
mate—as inspired by a legitimate, possibly true, surely partly true conception of the 
common good. And to see oneself on par with one’s opponents (in certain respects) 
means seeing one’s own claims as also legitimate. In a contest of competing, possibly 
legitimate claims, compromise itself becomes more legitimate. 
Whether this means we need to view opponents as reasonable is a tricky question, 
at least where the term “reasonable” refers to the standard of discourse required by the 
ideals of public reason and deliberative democracy.57 “Reasonable” might denote a very 
basic standard—one where the terms of an argument are consistent with viewing citizens 
as free and equal. Formally speaking (without getting into putative motivations), one 
might say that all the various arguments at work in politics today—for and against health 
care, progressive taxation, even voter identification laws—are consistent with this very 
basic standard. But “reasonable” also might denote something more demanding: it might 
ask not only that the formal terms of a political argument be rendered in a manner con-
sistent with freedom and equality, but further, that the motivations for offering the terms 
be consistent with seeing citizens as free and equal (they be offered in “good faith”). Or, 
more demanding still, the doctrine of “reasonableness” might require that the terms of 
political argument reflect the most demanding understanding of what it means to view 
citizens as free and equal. 
                                                	   56.	  	   JOHN	  RAWLS,	  POLITICAL	  LIBERALISM	  231	  (1st	  ed.,	  1993).	  	  	   57.	  	   See	   Joshua	  Cohen,	  Democracy	  and	  Liberty,	   in	  DELIBERATIVE	  DEMOCRACY:	  CAMBRIDGE	  STUDIES	   IN	   THE	  THEORY	  OF	  DEMOCRACY	  185-­‐224	  (Jon	  Elster	  ed.,	  1998);	  John	  Rawls,	  The	  Idea	  of	  Public	  Reason	  Revisited,	  in	  COLLECTED	   PAPERS	   573-­‐615	   (Samuel	   Freeman	   ed.,	   1996)	   [hereinafter	   RAWLS,	  The	   Idea	   of	   Public	   Reason	  
Revisited].	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Under these more demanding interpretations, many arguments that abound in con-
temporary political life might fail to satisfy the standard. Voter identification laws are 
arguably motivated less by a desire to combat voter fraud and more by a desire to dis-
courage certain demographics (ones unlikely to vote Republican) from voting; if so, they 
are not offered in good faith. Arguments against campaign finance legislation or progres-
sive taxation or health care arguably would have the effect of deepening social and eco-
nomic inequalities, with the further consequence of cementing inequalities of political 
influence. From a more demanding perspective of what counts as “reasonable,” one 
might not view one’s opponents as “reasonable,” or as offering terms of argument con-
sistent with the freedom and equality of citizens. 
The “spirit of compromise” calls on us to accommodate political opponents even 
when we do not see them as “reasonable” in this (more demanding) sense of the term. It 
asks us to see them as legitimate even when we cannot see them as reasonable; in this 
sense, the spirit of compromise is a declension from the highest ideals of deliberative 
democracy. Perhaps declension is not right, since the spirit of compromise asks for more 
than deliberative democracy: we need to respect political opponents even when they do 
not seem respectable. As a declension that asks for more, the spirit of compromise is 
more worldly: it is something that workable, successful democratic politics needs. 
Still, the possibility of compromising with opponents we do not view as reasonable 
points to obvious risks invited by a mindset of compromise. For their part, Gutmann and 
Thompson remain alive to these risks throughout.58 To maintain a point-of-view that sees 
one’s opponents as legitimate risks the vice of trimming—of preferring the median posi-
tion between two opposing views, regardless of the particulars.59 Trimmers never see 
compromise as undesirable; at the extreme, they have no conviction or “ideal point” 
from which they might compromise. As a result, they cannot recognize cases in which 
compromise is undesirable, practically and morally. President Obama knows the House 
of Representatives has voted dozens of times to repeal his health care law of 2010. And 
he knows that he cannot compromise by meeting the House “half-way.” The half-way 
point would look something like this: repeal the individual “mandate,” so offensive to 
libertarian sensibilities; but keep the exclusion of pre-existing conditions. That combina-
tion, as politically attractive as it would surely be, is practically unworkable. The only 
way to cover everyone, even those with preexisting conditions, is to generalize the risk 
by including even to those who for some reason prefer not to insure themselves. 
In some sense, compromise is never quite admirable, if only because compromises 
make little sense.60 They often betray a jumble of competing intentions, and defy coher-
ent explanation. Consider the so-called “farm bill,” which was defeated in the summer of 
2013 in the House of Representatives.61 The farm bill, which was first crafted in the 
                                                	   58.	  	   See	  GUTMANN	  &	  THOMPSON,	  supra	  note	  15,	  at	  78-­‐85.	  	  	   59.	  	   While	   they	   affirm	   that	   compromise	   has	   its	   “limits,”	   Gutmann	   and	   Thompson	   suggest	   that	  “[t]rimmers	  may	  not	  deserve	  the	  negative	  connotation	  they	  have	  long	  endured.”	  Id.	  at	  221	  n.12;	  see	  also	  GOODIN,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  56	  (for	  the	  negative	  connotation	  put	  forcefully).	  	   60.	   See	  GUTMANN	  &	  	  THOMPSON,	  supra	  note	  15,	  at	  40-­‐41.	  	   61.	  	   Burleigh	  C.	  W.	  Leonard,	  In	  the	  Aftermath	  of	  the	  Farm	  Bill’s	  Defeat,	  ROLL	  CALL	  (July	  10,	  2013,	  3:56	  PM),	   http://www.rollcall.com/news/in_the_aftermath_of_the_farm_bills_defeat_commentary-­‐226254-­‐1.html.	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1970s and re-passed routinely since then (until 2012, when its consideration was delayed 
and 2013 when it was defeated) is a collection of compromises. To attract members of 
Congress from urban districts, it appropriates money for food stamps, or the Supple-
mental Nutrition Assistance Program; to attract votes from rural districts, it appropriates 
money for agricultural subsidies paid to farmers. These subsidies involve a patchwork of 
further compromises among dairy, cotton, soy, and corn growers.62 A bill that contains a 
web of subsidies for farmers and an anti-hunger program does not make much sense: if 
there is something for everyone to like, there is also something for everyone to object to. 
It is difficult to imagine justifying this sort of legislation in terms consistent with public 
reason; the only justification is practical. The alternative to the farm bill may be no bill at 
all. 
The ethos of compromise points to a mode of public reason somewhat distinct 
from the one that has been worked out in relation to deliberative democracy. Public rea-
son says that the reasons justifying coercive legislation need to be public and need to be 
consistent with viewing citizens as free and equal. In its most demanding form, the rea-
sons justifying legislation need to be consistent with, if not derived from, a conception of 
justice. But the reasons that in fact justify the compromises that make democratic legisla-
tion possible seem to be of a different kind. As Gutmann and Thompson say, “[a] com-
promise is not meant to be coherent or principled in the way that laws are ideally sup-
posed to be . . . . The outcome will not be satisfying if judged from the perspective of any 
single principle or set of principles.”63 At bottom, the justification for compromise legis-
lation is simply that governing in a democracy prevents us from getting all we claim; 
even if we think our claims are fully valid, at best, they can only be partly satisfied. 
The idea that respectable political argument should be based in a complete and co-
herent conception of the common good is more at home in campaigning than in govern-
ing. Candidates’ “support and ultimately their success in the campaign depend[s] on reaf-
firming their uncompromising commitment to core principles and on distinguishing their 
positions sharply from those of their opponents.”64 Especially when it concerns funda-
mental questions—and many ordinary political issues involve fundamental questions—
this kind of argument based in a complete political conception nicely conforms to a cer-
tain ideal of public reason.65 
But it can also amplify the uncompromising mindset. In Gutmann and Thompson’s 
analysis, the rise of the permanent campaign is largely responsible for the dominance of 
                                                	   62.	  	   My	  understanding	  of	  the	  farm	  bill	  is	  informed	  by	  Harry	  Stein,	  Associate	  Director	  for	  Fiscal	  Policy	  at	  the	  Center	  for	  American	  Progress.	  Harry	  Stein,	  The	  Farm	  Bill	  Is	  All	  About	  Compromise…	  and	  That’s	  Why	  
House	   Republicans	   Can’t	   Pass	   It,	   NOT	   ABOUT	   QUALITY	   BLOG	   (June	   21,	   2013),	  http://notaboutquality.com/2013/06/21/the-­‐farm-­‐bill-­‐is-­‐all-­‐about-­‐compromise-­‐and-­‐thats-­‐why-­‐house-­‐republicans-­‐cant-­‐pass-­‐it/.	  	   63.	  	   GUTMANN	  &	  THOMPSON,	  supra	  note	  15,	  at	  37.	  	  	   64.	  	   Id.	  at	  147.	  	  	   65.	  	   	  See	  RAWLS,	  The	  Idea	  of	  Public	  Reason	  Revisited,	  supra	  note	  56,	  at	  58	  (stating	  that	  an	  “essential	  fea-­‐ture	  of	  public	  reason	  is	  that	  its	  political	  conceptions	  should	  be	  complete.	  This	  means	  that	  each	  concep-­‐tion	  should	  express	  principles,	  standards,	  and	  ideals,	  along	  with	  guidelines	  of	  inquiry,	  such	  that	  the	  val-­‐ues	  specified	  by	  it	  can	  be	  suitably	  ordered	  or	  otherwise	  united.”).	  Rawls	  is	  addressing	  arguments	  about	  “fundamental	   political	   questions,”	   but	   these	   arise	   in	   everyday	  politics	   just	   as	   forcefully	   as	   at	   constitu-­‐tional	  conventions.	  See	  id.	  at	  585-­‐86.	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the uncompromising mindset.66 Governing calls on a far more nuanced instantiation of 
public reason than campaigning. One might support the farm bill not because one sup-
ports this or that agricultural subsidy, but because this seems the best way of solidifying 
political support for anti-hunger programs. “On the whole,” one might say, “this bill ad-
vances the common good, in spite of prominent parts that I think are wasteful or destruc-
tive.” That is the way justification in real politics goes—when real politics goes well. It 
is the kind of justification that anyone who cares about governance will appreciate.67 
Cultivating this appreciation is the aim of Gutmann and Thompson’s book. In this 
partisan age, in the moment of the permanent campaign, they are trying to nourish an ap-
preciation of the kind of public reason relevant to actual legislation. This will be a vastly 
more untidy species of public reason than the sort that is more aligned with campaigning 
or position-taking. While Sennett and Goodin are less concerned with formal politics, in 
a fundamental way they are saying the same thing. To appreciate the value of settling, we 
need to see that we cannot get everything we want, even if we deserve it. And to culti-
vate the skills of cooperation, we need—as Sennett says—to appreciate the seemingly 
inconsequential and non-linear character of dialogical conversation.68 CONCLUSION	  
To generalize from these three accounts, we might say that the public reason of 
democracy is untidy. It covers accommodations that will not be fully justifiable, and re-
flects a balance of competing ideals and interests that can never be fully reconciled. 
Campaigning—standing up for what we believe or know to be true—is easy. Govern-
ing—actually living together in a common political community—is something else: frus-
trating, compromising, and untidy. The public reason of democracy cannot but reflect 
that untidiness. 
Each of these authors asks that we remember how to value the political virtues 
connected to cooperation: the mindset of compromise, a disposition to settle, and an 
openness to dialogical discussion. At the moment, politics (in the United States) does not 
seem to reward any of these traits. 
Yet apart from the self-defeating histrionics that the partisan fray exhibits, it may 
be that partisans are framing a fundamental choice that voters need to make. For a gener-
ation, American politics has straddled two positions: one that values social insurance, 
effective regulation, military capacity, and other functions that government serves; and 
                                                	   66.	  	   GUTMANN	  &	  THOMPSON,	  supra	  note	  15,	  at	  23.	  	  	   67.	  	   	  Contrast	  this	  with	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  Rawls	  conflates	  the	  public	  reason	  of	  candidates	  and	  offi-­‐cials:	  	   This	   ideal	   [of	  public	   reason]	   is	   realized,	   or	   satisfied,	  whenever	   judges,	   legislators,	  chief	  executives,	  and	  other	  governmental	  officials,	  as	  well	  as	  candidates	  for	  public	  office,	   act	   from	  and	   follow	   the	   idea	  of	   public	   reason	  and	  explain	   to	  other	   citizens	  their	  reasons	  for	  supporting	  fundamental	  political	  positions	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  political	  conception	  of	   justice	   they	  regard	  as	  most	  reasonable.	   In	   this	  way	  they	   fulfill	  what	  [Rawls]	   call[s]	   their	   duty	   of	   civility	   to	   one	   another	   and	   to	   other	   citizens.	   Hence,	  whether	  judges,	  legislators,	  and	  chief	  executives	  act	  from	  and	  follow	  public	  reason	  is	  continuously	  shown	  in	  their	  speech	  and	  conduct	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  RAWLS,	  The	  Idea	  of	  Public	  Reason	  Revisited,	  supra	  note	  56,	  at	  576-­‐77.	  	   68.	  	   SENNETT,	  TOGETHER,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  14.	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another that views government as more the problem than the solution to our problems. 
That straddle has produced an expansion of governmental activities (and its correlated 
expense) along with a succession of tax cuts, and, predictably, permanent structural 
budget deficits. Whether citizens want the national government to take an active role in 
addressing national problems is an open question in a way that it has not been for genera-
tions. In this context, the virtues of “taking a stand” are evident, and the value of com-
promise, settling, and open-ended dialogue is harder to see. 
Taken together, these books are right to insist that we remember how to value the 
virtues of cooperation. As a polity, we may get stuck and find ourselves unable to re-
solve, even provisionally, the national government’s role. Or we may make a choice, and 
one party over the other may come to attract a durable national majority. Either way, we 
will need to recapture the virtues of living together. There are high stakes at risk in 
American politics at the moment: we are hammering out some of the fundamental terms 
of the public philosophy that will frame the compromises, settlements, and discussions of 
our public life. When the stakes are high, it seems right to take a stand. But regardless of 
how the contest of the moment is settled, we are at risk of losing a way of valuing a set 
of political virtues essential to living together. 	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